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專家組就高鐵對大角咀舊樓影響 及風險評估的建議

二月 8, 2010

二、事實上,按照正常項目進度,由於港鐵公司已基本完成了高鐵的詳細設計,港鐵已經對受影響的每一棟樓宇,完成了「樓宇現狀測量」(Building conditions survey) 及「建築物影響評估」(Building and Structure Impact Assessment) 。
三、根據《 環 境 影 響 評 估 條 例 》內的環 境 影 響 評 估 程 序 的 技 術 備 忘 錄,工程項目的環境影響應該盡可能採用「定量環境影響評價」(4.3.1(c)) 。由於公眾對舊樓安全危害生命的關注,參照技 術 備 忘 錄第12條的規定,制定「定量危險評估」是最切合時宜的安排。附件4圖1的風險指引,可以作為安全風險是否達標的參考。
一、港鐵公司應向大角咀居民馬上公佈已完成的「樓宇現狀測量」報告 (Building conditions survey) 及「建築物影響評估」報告 (Building and Structure Impact Assessment) 。
二、港鐵公司應參照環 境 影 響 評 估 程 序 的 技 術 備 忘 錄第12條的規定或國際最佳守則,馬上開展對大角咀舊樓羣進行「定量危險評估」。
四、政府應參照「昂坪360」工程項目的做法,由獨立團體主動邀請大角咀居民和持份者代表,與港鐵代表一起組成「聯合監察小組」(Sustainability Advisory Panel) ,讓居民持續監察項目進展及提供意見。
*                      *                      *

8 February 2010
Press Release
Recommendations from the XRL Expert Group Regarding the Effects on the Old Residential Blocks in Tai Kok Tsui from the XRL and on the Risk Evaluations
In view of the disaster over the collapse of the building in Ma Tau Wai Road and on the cracks found in the building in Oak Street in Tai Kok Tsui, the concerns on the safety of the old flats from the general public has increased, the “XRL Expert Group” of The Professional Commons has conducted a preliminary analysis of the effects of the Express Rail link (hereafter the XRL) project to the old buildings in Tai Kok Tsui, and take reference to the Technical Memorandum stipulated in the Environment Impact Assessment Ordinance and the judgement by the Court of Final Appeal of “Shui Wing Steel vs Environmental Protection Department and the Airport Authority” in 2005. The conclusions are as follows:  
1)      Although the MTR Corporation has basically completed the detailed design of the XRL, the information it has been distributed to the residents in Tai Kok Tsui is very limited, it failed to address the concerns of the residents towards the safety of old buildings. When judging whether a project design has reached the standards, not only it should include a common safety standard, it should also include the “level of comfort” as assessed by the user. Hence, as the project manager, the MTR Corporation should shoulder responsibilities on relieving the concerns of the general public. 
2)      In fact, in accordance with the normal operational speed, as the MTR Corporation has basically completed the detailed design of the XRL. The MTR Corporation has completed the “Building Conditions Survey” and the “Building and Structure Impact Assessment” in each of the affected building. 
3)      According to the Technical Memorandum regarding the procedures of the environmental impact assessment under the “Environment Impact Assessment Ordinance”, the environmental impact of projects should adopt the “assessment of effects in quantitative terms” (4.3.1 (c)). In view of the concerns over the public safety of old buildings, it would be most appropriate arrangements should an “ Quantitative Risk Assessment" in accordance with Clause 12 of the Technical Memorandum takes place. The risk guidelines at Graph 1 in Attachment 4 could act as a reference on whether the safety risks standards can be reached.   
4)      According to the Court of Final Appeal judgement of “Shui Wing Steel vs Environmental Protection Department and the Hong Kong Airport Authority” in 2005, the “assessments of effects in quantitative terms” is an indispensible procedure for an environmental impact assessment affecting lives. The reason in which the “Environment Protection Department and the Airport Authority” lost the judgement and the order for withdrawal of the Environmental Permit from the Court of Final Appeal are due to the fact that the project proponents have not conducted the “Quantitative Risk Assessment" at that moment.
Hence, The “XRL Expert group” of The Professional Commons proposed the following recommendations: 
1)      The MTR Corporation should immediately publicize the Building Conditions Survey and the Building and Structure Impact Assessment to the residents in Tai Kok Tsui. 
2)      The MTR Corporation should take reference to Clause 12 of the Technical Memorandum of the Environmental Impact Assessment procedures and the international best practice, and conduct the “Quantitative Risk Assessment" for the cluster of old buildings in Tai Kok Tsui.
3)      Before the completion of the “Quantitative Risk Assessment", the MTR Corporation should postpone the time of the signing of the contracts regarding the tender procedure of the relevant tunneling section works, so as to avoid the monetary loss incurred as a result of the changes in the design of the alignment. 
4)      The Government should take reference to the practice conducted from the “Ngong Ping 360” engineering project, in which a “Joint Supervisory Panel” should be set up by an independent organization, and it should proactively invites the residents in Tai Kok Tsui and representatives from other stakeholders. The Panel should allow the residents to continue to supervise the progress of the projects and provide opinions on the projects concerned.   
*                      *                      *


FACV No. 28 of 2005




(On appeal from CACV NO. 350 of 2003)


Between :

  Your browser may not support display of this image.SHIU WING Your browser may not support display of this image.STEEL LIMITED Appellant 
(Interested Party)


Court: Mr Justice Bokhary PJ, Mr Justice Chan PJ, Mr Justice Ribeiro PJ, Mr Justice Mortimer NPJ and Sir Gerard Brennan NPJ

Dates of Hearing: 12 to 16 June 2006

Date of Judgment: 17 July 2006



The requirements of the SB and the TM

31.  SWS submits that the EIA report failed to meet the requirements of the SB and the TM because it did not contain a QRA in respect of all hazardous risk scenarios associated with the tank farm storage of aviation fuel which may cause fatalities and, in particular, the scenario of a catastrophic instantaneous 100% loss of fuel causing a surge of fuel to overtop the bund and flow into SWS mill with resulting loss of life and property.  The scenario was referred to in the EIA report but the QRA contained in that report did not embrace that scenario.  In para.20 of his judgment, Stock JA described a QRA as follows :

“As I understand it, and putting the matter broadly, a QRA involves, after the identification of the hazard, an analysis reduced to mathematical terms, of frequency of an occurrence and a modelling of the consequences of that occurrence.  A qualitative analysis does not differ in its objective but its analysis and expression is more judgmental though it is not purely a judgmental matter."

32.  As the argument on appeal developed, it appeared that there was a significant difference between the parties in their understanding of what was required to complete a QRA.  To resolve that difference, it is necessary to examine a number of the clauses of both the TM and the SB.

33.  Section 4.1.1 of the TM defines the general content to be contained in an EIA report :

“An EIA report shall comprise a document or series of documents providing a detailed assessment in quantitative terms, wherever possible, and in qualitative terms of the likely environmental impacts and environmental benefits of the project.  The requirements for the EIA report shall be set out in accordance with this technical memorandum.  The EIA report shall be produced in accordance with the EIA study brief issued by the Director to the applicant."

It is clear that the objectives and scope of an EIA report are to be specific to the project (s.4.2.1) adequately addressing all the issues set out in the SB (s.4.2.2).  In s.4.3.1 the TM sets out the general principles which the Director must use in evaluating the assessment methodologies adopted in an EIA report.

34.  Annexes 4 to 10 of the TM prescribe the criteria for evaluating the different categories of impact which a project might have on the environment: air quality, noise, water pollution, waste management, the ecology, fisheries, visual and landscape, cultural heritage and, relevant to the present case, hazard to human life.  Section 4.3.1(c) provides :

“(c) Impact Evaluation: an evaluation of the anticipated changes and effects shall be made with respect to the criteria described in Annexes 4 to 10 inclusive, and in quantitative terms as far as possible …"

Annex 4 is the annex dealing with hazard to life.

35.  Section 12.1 of the TM identifies certain factors which are relevant to the need for a Hazard Assessment (“HA") and provides that the Director shall consider the need for a HA and its technical requirements.  (The Director’s duty is “subject to the advice of the authorities stated in Annex 22″ but that annex specifies the Director himself to be the relevant authority.)

36.  Section 12.1 directs that the Risk Guidelines to be applied in relation to hazard to life are set out in Annex 4 and Figure 1.  Clause 2.1 of Annex 4 provides that “[t]he criterion for hazard to human life is to meet the Risk Guidelines, as shown in Figure 1″.  

( 499 16 )



2. 介 








10. 16(1)(f)

11. 使



      (a)  :  使 調 附近 調 調 類別 使
      (b)  :  附件 12 19 類似 使 /國
        (iii) /環
        (v) /或
        (vi) 使 附件 4 10
      (c)  :  附件 4 10
        (iii) 使
        (v) 4.4.3  


12.1 附件 22 附件 4 1




一月 6, 2010




自特區成立以來,政府基建工程的每年總量大约在200至300億元之間,但自從政府在2007年宣佈推行十大基建工程後,各項工程的設計及招標陸續 完成,預計從2010年起,工程總量會倍增至每年500億元以上。由於主要基建工程的施工均倚賴屈指可數的幾家大承建商,加上本地合適工種的工人不可能突 然大輻增加,工程標價因此被大輻推高的效應至為明顯。



由此可以初步推算,目前高鐵項目的669億元造價中,有134億元(即20.1%) 是由於急促上馬而額外付出的代價。若果政府願意把不同基建工程有秩序地分期上馬,投標價格會轉趨下降,很可能節省這134億的大部份或全部開支。過去兩 年,星加坡政府正是按照上述思維,把部份工程押後,節省投資。


由於工程施工能力上限的因素和政府財政開支的考慮,高鐵和港珠澳大橋這兩個特大項目,已經對不少其他基建和民生工程產生「擠壓效應」,迫使這些項目 延誤或擱置。據悉,政府內部在去年11月進行的「資源分配程序」(Resource Allocation Exercise) 中,很多原來安排上馬,應從乙級(即籌劃設計階段) 升上甲級(即申請撥款施工) 的項目,都被叫停,從往年的幾十個項目減至幾個。


  • 中九龍幹線工程(動工日期由2011年延誤至少兩年)
  • 全港食水管更換第四期工程
  • 全港鄉郊排污工程
  • 吐露港公路改善第三期工程
  • 大埔濾水廠更新第二期工程
  • 沙中線鐵路項目




若果政府馬上採納公共專業聯盟「新高鐵專家組」的「貫通南北新高鐵方案」,未來兩年先進行詳細設計、環評和刋憲程序,實際施工從2012年起進行, 估計完工日期在2015年,與政府方案相約。延遲兩年開工的好處是避開了基建高峯期,使因為施工能力超負荷而造價上升的浪費減少。同時,節省下來的三百億 元可以用於其他民生工程,而且由於這些工程所需的工人屬於不同工種,兼且更人力密集,真正能夠受惠的工人更多,對社會效益更大。



政府就高鐵新方案發表失實指控 公專聯詳細回應並發出律師信

一月 5, 2010




















1.     公共專業聯盟致特區政府律師信

2.     公共專業聯盟致立法會財委會主席劉慧卿議員的函件

附件 1:


Our ref: AW/60458/10/A 

By FAX(2868 4643) & POST

Secretary for Transport and Housing

14-16/F Murray Building

Garden Road, Central

Hong Kong 

(Attn: Ms. Eva Cheng) 

Dear Madam, 

Re: Express Rail Link Alternative Proposal by The Professional Commons Limited 

We act for The Professional Commons Limited (“our client”). Our client is a public policy think tank dedicated to research on public policies in Hong Kong. As you know, our client has recently conducted a study and published a public policy proposal regarding the construction of the Hongkong section of the Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hongkong Express Rail Link (the “Proposal”). The Proposal was put together by a group of professionals who are experts on railway, engineering, planning, transport and other related professional fields.  Our client publicly promotes the Proposal, as an alternative to the one currently suggested by your bureau, in the hope that both the public and the Government could determine which proposal is more cost-effective and serves better Hongkong’s long term interest. 

However, we are instructed that in recent public statements issued by the Government, you and your officials had deliberately or inadvertently given several misleading statements to the public regarding the various features and details of the Proposal. They are as follows:  

  1. Terminus Footprint


    The Proposal involves building a terminus at Kam Sheung Road which is smaller than that at the West Kowloon as proposed by the Government due to the ability of trains to pass to the south and to the depot without conflict with trains entering from the north. 
    However, the Government made an assumption, which our client strongly disagrees, that the terminus is of the same size as that at West Kowloon and hence needs a larger footprint and requires the realignment / diversion of the Route 3 Highway. 

      We are instructed that the above assumption is incorrect. 

  1. Need to divert Kam Tin River


    When considering the alignment to the north, the Government assumed that the Kam Tin River needs to be diverted and hence requires resumption of new housing in Kat Hing Wai and Sha Po Tsuen.  Indeed, when you study in details the alignment contained in the Proposal, you would notice that the aforesaid areas are avoided and does not require any major river diversion. 
  1. Kam Sheung Road Station


    Although the Government was already told on 12 October 2009 that our client had proposals for both an underground and an above ground station, it was made clear that the above ground station was the preferred option and was the one being carried forward for more detailed development.  However, the Government still presented our client’s scheme with the arrival and departure concourses at underground only with a car park at sub-basement level inferring that this was how our scheme would be developed.  
    Had Government consulted our client further, they would have been advised that only minimal works would be underground with concourses and car parking either below or above the rail tracks. 
  1. Capacity for the Hong Kong Island Express


    The Government’s assertions are that the number of Airport Express passengers are proportional to the Hongkong International Airport (“HKIA”) throughput capacity on the Airport Railway. This is misleading as the number of passengers on the Airport Express has remained roughly the same since the airport opening in 1998 notwithstanding the increase in HKIA throughput. The Government has thus given a misleading analysis of the capacity on the Airport Railway required for the Airport Express Service.  
  1. Train Graphs


    At the Legco Railways Subcommittee (“the Subcommittee”) meeting on 6 November 2009, the Government presented train graphs which showed a conflict of service with the number of trains proposed by our client.  Nevertheless, these graphs failed to incorporate fundamentals of train scheduling utilising station dwell times.  We are of the view that such failure of incorporation was a deliberate move to present a misleading picture to the Subcommittee.  Our client has since produced train graphs, with the above fundamentals incorporated, to show that there would not be any conflicts.  However, in an interview with the media on 31 December 2009 the Director of Highways still repeated to the media that there would be 15 unresolvable conflicts in a 30-minute interval during the section between Kowloon Station and Hong Kong Station, which is a clear misrepresentation of our client’s proposed services. 
  1. Protection of the Harbour Ordinance


    A group at the Subcommittee meeting on 6 November 2009 relied on the “Protection of the Harbour Ordinance” (“the Ordinance”) as a reason for requiring a very long span across the Rambler Channel for the Hong Kong Island Express.  In that event, it is supposed that piers have to be constructed along the span.  In an interview with the media on 31 December 2009, this was taken up by the Director of Highways in his criticism of the Proposal.  He said that a pier (or piers) in the Rambler Channel would pose difficulties. However, your Bureau or the Director of Highways should notice that principle and procedure are already laid down under the Ordinance for compliance and there is no suggestion that a pier or piers would not be accepted under the Ordinance since the Express Rail Link is considered by the Government to be a project of overriding public needs.   
  1. Construction Costs and Construction Programme


    Due to those various incorrect or misleading assumptions made by the Government in respect of the Proposal, the Government accordingly made an incorrect estimate of the cost and time of construction under the Proposal. 

In the circumstances, we are instructed to emphasize, which we hereby do, that as public officials, you or your Bureau should have a duty to present the Proposal to the public in a fair, non-biased and objective manner. Any misrepresentation or misleading comment about the Proposal made by your Bureau would tarnish and/or lower the professional image and reputation of our client as well as the individual professionals involved in preparing the Proposal. 

We hereby request that you and your Bureau shall refrain from making any further similar misleading statements about the Proposal in all your future communication with the public and shall instruct your officials to do the same. 

In the meantime, all our client’s rights are reserved. 

Yours faithfully, 

 Yours faithfully, 

Yip, Tse & Tang 


c.c. client 


您好!得悉立法會財委會將於2010年1月8日審議高速鐵路撥款事宜,我謹代表公共專業聯盟的「新高鐵專家組」(下稱「專家組」) ,要求派員出席上述會議,理由如下:
一、為了向議員解答政府的質疑,專家組曾在11月10日、15日及17日三次致函立法會鐵路事宜小組委員會,要求派員出席會議,但均不得要領。劉健儀議員更在17日的會議上誤稱專家組一直沒有解答政府的質疑 (儘管專家組已在15日向立法會提出兩份技術文件,見要求劉健儀議員致歉的附函) ,使議員產生誤解,而這些誤解在隨後的立法會會議上一直沒有得到糾正,但政府代表則在立法會會議上,不斷質疑專家組的方案。因此,為了確保程序公義,財委會有義務讓專家組成員出席會議,以示公允,並讓議員充份掌握正反兩方的資訊。


一月 5, 2010


· 在九龍製造永久交通大混亂
· 剝奪新界居民就業和發展機會
· 妨礙西九文化區設計和發展
· 接駁困難的西九總站使旅客費時失事
· 犧牲菜園村和破壞市區環境






「西九龍交通影響評估報告」政府不想你知道的: 14.6億的額外投資

十二月 17, 2009

新聞稿 17/12/2009

「西九龍交通影響評估報告」政府不想你知道的: 14.6億的額外投資

將不可能解決西九龍的交通問題 政府只選擇性地公佈「交通評估報告」(報告)的結論,但沒有披露「報告」內稱有關道路網絡未能應付將來交通流量的預測,今天記者會的目的就是要向公眾披露這些我們認為極有可能構成誤導之疑點。 撥款予高鐵的669億元中,政府將花近115億元於西九龍總站附近興建額外的交通基礎設施,但根據報告,「上述設施只能勉強應付截至2031年道路網絡可持續發展的最起碼要求」。


即使能夠落實所有建議,亦將要投入額外的資金,使興建高鐵的成本高達700億以上,這還未計於6個現有交通交匯處(交匯處)很有可能出現的擠塞情況。 研究報告表明,在道路基礎設施沒有任何改善的情況下,41個在九龍的交匯處中有18個將不勝負荷。

報告並預期,縱使進行擴闊路段(至13條行車線)工程,仍然有11個交匯處將達至「接近飽和」的狀態。 為進一步緩和這11個交匯處的交通負荷,報告建議加強對道路工程投入額外投資。報告指出,若這些「額外措施」得到落實,將使「研究區域」內大部分路段(不是全部)具有「備用容量」。但事實上,「飽和問題」仍在至少6個路段出現,因此交通擠塞問題仍將不時出現。另外,一些於路口出現的擠塞問題可能會延伸至「上游」路段,進而加劇交通擠塞的情況。 報告並沒有就上述「額外措施」之可行性作出任何保證;專家組並質疑興建連接廣東道與柯士甸道交匯處地下行車道之建議。

上述建議亦沒有於任何地區場合提出,更遑論是批准。 建議的「改善措施」將使新增之交通流量轉移至附近較狹窄的舊街道,這將對鄰近同屬九龍的商業與住宅區構成嚴重影響。報告還指出部分九龍地區將會被那13條行車線的道路所覆蓋。




高鐵專家組成員黎廣德 工程師熊永達 博士梁啟智 博士吳永輝 先生龐婉儀 小姐泰萊 工程師司馬文 先生 

 17 Dec 2009

The secret West Kowloon Reclamation Development Traffic Study The Government doesn’t want us to know: 14.6 billion supporting infrastructure will NOT solve the West Kowloon traffic problems Hong Kong, 17 December 2009 –

Government has only released selected parts of the conclusions of a Traffic Study. It has NOT released those conclusions which indicate that the road network cannot support the predicted traffic. This has been revealed by members of the Express Rail Expert Group of the independent engineers organization Pro-Commons.

Having spent $11.5 billion for additional works included in the $66.9Bn package for the Express Rail Link the study reports that “This road infrastructure package could be considered as the minimum requirements that would provide a marginally sustainable road network up to 2031”.

Consultants working for the Government have undertaken a “West Kowloon Reclamation Development Traffic Study” to study the effects on the road traffic once the Express Rail Terminus and the West Kowloon Cultural District are completed.

The Study Report gives a comprehensive account of the traffic issues and sets out drastic recommendations to alleviate some of the anticipated problems. Many of the recommendations are unproven and will have an unacceptable impact on the local community. Even when all are implemented, which requires additional funding bringing the Express Rail cost above HK$70 billion, at least 6 junctions will be congested.

The Traffic Study shows that, without any improvement of the road infrastructure, 18 of the 41 junctions in Kowloon will be overloaded. It expects that with “improvements” – including widening roads up to 13 lanes wide – 11 identified junctions would still only have “marginal capacity” as opposed to “adequate spare capacity”.

To further alleviate the lack of capacity at these 11 junctions, the study considered additional investments in road works. It noted that after implementing these “additional schemes” most (but not all) of the junctions within the Study Area would be operating with spare capacity.

 In fact, the study shows that at least 6 junctions can not be resolved. Congestion can therefore be expected at times. Traffic queues at some junctions are predicted to extend to the junction immediately upstream thus aggravating the congestion. The study report gives no assurances of the feasibility of these additional schemes and throws doubt on the proposed underpass along Canton Road at the junction with Austin Road. There is also no suggestion that that these proposals have been seen, let alone approved, at District level.

The proposed “improvements” will divert traffic though adjacent narrow streets having a dramatic impact on the residential and commercial neighbourhoods of Kowloon.

The Study also shows that a large percentage of the land in Kowloon will be covered by the widening of roads with up to 13 lanes for some sections and that there will be an encroachment into the West Kowloon Cultural District Site by between 10 and 25 metres.

The Express Rail Expert Group believes that a number of improvements will be unacceptable to the local community The cost of the junction improvements and additional schemes was not assessed in the study.

 However when they are, the cost of the Express Rail Link project could easily rise from the current figure of $66.9Bn to above $70Bn.

The Express Rail Expert Group is comprised of Ir Albert Lai, Dr Hung Wing Tat, Dr Leung Kai Chi, Mr Stanley Ng, Ms Pong Yuen Yee, Ir Ronald Taylor and Mr Paul Zimmerman.

梁啟智 : 秦皇徒把長城築

十二月 15, 2009

近日網上流傳一段「車公顯靈高鐵要停」的短片,兩個年輕人拿結他唱出今年年初的車公籤文「秦皇徒把長城築、禍去禍來皆自招」。筆者不想迷信,不過一眾高官不問成本力撐高鐵是救港靈丹,無視他們自己才是香港被邊緣化的真正原由,倒和籤文的寓意互相呼應。政府的高鐵方案固然問題多多,不過這些問題原來只是病徵;高鐵反映出香港政治體制的深層問題,原來早已病入膏肓。 第一個問題,是政府壟斷專業語言。政府在立法會發表60 頁文件,以各式各樣的圖表數據,羅列認為錦上路方案並不可取的理由。不少傳媒朋友讀過這份文件後,都認同了政府的觀點,指新方案不夠專業。然而這份文件本身,又有誰來驗證是否專業? 政府所謂證據原來如此兒戲 舉個例,專家組一直堅持新方案只會在錦田影響約50 戶民居。政府抹黑新方案,要在這影響戶數之上做文章,本是意料中事;沒想到的,是其技巧竟差劣到自相矛盾的地步。在11 月1 日於民主黨的辯論會中,政府代表聲稱新方案會影響461 戶;然而到了11 月6日,同一個政府代表拿同一份簡報去立法會,同一頁投照片中的同一項數字,卻忽然變成了308 戶。兩份文件所述的背景完全一樣,舊的數據卻可於5 天內失效。所謂的證據原來如此兒戲,試問這新一組的數字還能取信於人嗎?難怪當初政府代表要在民主黨議員的責難之下,才萬般不願意地留下簡報的副本。 類似的數字陷阱,在這份文件中俯拾即是。很可惜,只要用上大量的專業語言,配上政府工程師的招牌,傳媒和市民就會信以為真。再加上民間社會缺乏獨立的專家學者,而政府又坐擁龐大的人力、財力和信息優勢,所以幾乎完全毋須就其言論或承諾負責。可悲的是,政府以專業語言來愚弄公眾是有後果的。一個政府的正當統治,建基於市民對政府的信任。把這點也掉去,也就一無所有。 無責任發言的背後,是問責制的結構矛盾。一個政策局當中,局長、副局長、政治助理,連同秘書和司機,其實只得數人辦事;問責官員事無大小,還是要依賴高級公務員的協助。每天受市民批評的是問責官員,高級公務員卻幾乎在任何情下也不會失去工作,那麼他們又有何誘因向問責官員提供準確客觀的判斷和支援?問責官員稍不留神,甚至會無故中伏墮馬而不自知!這次高鐵對弈,筆者目睹問責官員如何拿已準備好的筆記,在鏡頭和議員面前把那些標準答案背誦如流,很可能自己也不察覺這些所謂的論據如何經不起驗證,頓為他們的危險處境不勝唏噓。 沒功能組別高鐵不可能過關 把這個分析框架放進高鐵的公眾參與當中,就會明白為何民怨四起。按西港島線的經驗,支援的官員一定知道收回地層和興建通風樓會引來極大的社區反響。聰明的做法,當然是提早到受影響的社區主動諮詢,不可以因為區議會沒有提意見就以為沒有人會反對。然而現今的情,卻是要等到傳媒報道和市民追查,大角嘴的居民才知道自己的地層被收回,葵涌的居民才知道自家的後院要建造巨型通風樓。筆者不敢假設問責官員都是立壞心場,然而事實若非如此,則只可推斷是支援的官員不知為何沒有預先向問責官員通報這些地雷炸彈,結果釀成市民政府皆輸。 當然,所有的體制問題歸根究柢,都可回到立法會功能組別的問題;沒有功能組別,高鐵就不可能在立法會過關。這點,很多市民已相當清楚和憤怒。回歸以來,香港發展諸事不順,背後都離不開這些體制問題。政府未解決這些體制問題,徒以大白象投資來救活香港,結果反而挑起更多的爭議。禍去禍來皆自招,但這些禍端都是政府而不是香港人自找的,香港人不要為政府的過錯埋單。

[2009-12-12 明報]

高鐵廿三條 政府還在隱瞞甚麽?

十二月 1, 2009


1. 政府一直聲稱高鐵帶來巨大經濟效益,卻違反政府自己的「公開資料守則」要求,拒絕公開可行性研究和經濟分析報告,使市民無從評估政府的分析存在多少水份。為甚麽? 

2. 政府估計有九成半旅客抵達西九總站後,必須轉車才能到達目的地,可是接駁不便,有半數旅客將被迫使用路面交通工具,但政府竟然聲稱這是最方便市民的車站,製造「市中心迷思」。為甚麽? 

3. 政府明知交通專家測算車站用量時,不會考慮超過五百米步行距離的人流,但卻聲稱西九總站最方便,是因為在五公里的半徑範圍內,有二百萬市區人口(包括須游泳至對岸的港島區市民),掩飾西九只是一個設於市區的接駁站的事實。為甚麽? 

4. 政府聲稱西九總站的吸引力,在於為內地旅客提供一個良好的第一印象,卻未有說明四成旅客須在地底轉車,一成旅客須步行12分鐘穿過商場轉車,四成半旅客在地面轉車時須面對連翔道的廢氣排放口;政府電腦模擬圖的園林景觀明顯誤導。為甚麽? 

5. 政府明知西九道路規劃失誤,造成塞車死症,難以容納西九總站每天五萬多的地面人流,更何况西九文化區還未完成設計,難以預測車流。政府建議多花118億元改造道路,聲稱能解決塞車,卻又在開會前幾天才容許議員查閱交通評估報告,使民間專家無法參與評核。為甚麽? 

6. 高鐵須征用西九文化區約三份一土地作為施工用地至2015年,以及近半的海濱地段,用來搬運相當於六楝國金二期體積的泥頭,但政府卻聲稱文化區將於2014年落成。互相矛盾的時間表,引證了西九總站與文化區根本不宜並存。為甚麼? 

7. 高鐵的延伸隧道座落在西九文化區地底,列車造成的震動和噪音使地面難以興建表演劇場,但政府卻拒絕解釋詳情,更禁止負責設計的三組建築師向外透露半點訊息。為甚麽? 

8. 政務司司長兼西九管理局主席唐英年在11月26日的會議中,對高鐵工程將會佔用西九文化區用地,向運輸局和路政署表達強烈不滿;既然政府內部仍未解決對高鐵工程的重大分歧,卻急於申請撥款。為甚麽? 

9. 專家組建議的新方案把高鐵總站設於錦上路,另從機場快線的青衣站新建一段支線直達錦上路,估計較政府方案節省逾300億元。即使政府曲解專家組建議,也承認新方案能節省238億元,但政府卻拒絕聘請獨立顧問深入研究。為甚麽? 

10. 機場鐵路中環站有22萬平方呎的月台荒廢12年,而機場快線的客運量在1998年啓用以來沒有增長,以致相等於200億元的資產廢置了12年。政府至今沒有提出改善方法,反而聲稱未來11年機場快線客運量會激增一倍,因此不能開展由香港站至錦上路的新服務。為甚麽? 

11. 專家組的新方案利用新建的港島快線,使香港站和九龍站的旅客可以在市區辦理登車手續,然後乘快線直達錦上路轉乘高鐵。政府明知這方案可以充份利用廢置了12年的200億元機場鐵路資產,卻寧願繼續容許港鐵公司增加車費,以補貼虧本的機場快線。為甚麽? 

12. 政府聲稱每日9 9,000人次的預測已經很保守,卻拒絕公開客運估算的詳细報告,又沒有交待今天直通車只有9000人次,和過去交通流量估算的敗績:深港西部通道的車流量只有原先估算的兩成,西鐵及機場快線的乘客量分別只有一半及四成。為甚麽? 

13. 政府聲稱啓用後的營運利潤率達31%,但有關估算是以完全不回收668億元投資及永遠不計利息為前提,更何况有關估算是假設跨境客運量從2008年至2016年間,每年須有5.4%增長,若果增長率輕微下降0.5%至4.9%,高鐵便很可能出現虧損,需要市民每天補貼。為甚麽? 

14. 由深圳去尖東,無論經西九龍還是錦上路,旅客同樣需轉一次車,同樣要坐西鐵接駁。比較而言,經西九龍只不過比經錦上路快七至十分鐘。政府寧願為了少量九龍區的旅客節省幾分鐘的時間而多花300億元。為甚麽? 

15. 政府認為多花300億元投資,讓少量九龍區的旅客節省七至十分鐘,是物有所值;卻不願投入同等資源解決過海塞車的問題,或者回購東隧和西隧,使數量更多的旅客省回更多時間。為甚麽? 

16. 專家組方案不但方便新界三百多萬市民,更使轉乘高鐵的機場旅客節省十分鐘;政府棄而不用,認為方便內地來港旅客更重要,即使他們只佔全部旅客的三成,而且大部份並非以西九龍為目的地,也在所不計。為甚麽? 

17. 政府明知專家組方案可以帶動新界發展,為元朗、屯門、天水圍區民提多更多就業機會,有助降低貧窮率,卻堅持遷就權貴,把總站設在欠缺發展空間的西九,使市區與新界的發展更加失衡。為甚麽? 

18. 政府在提交立法會的文件內…認只需要6至7個長途車月台,但又堅持要興建9個長途車月台,自相矛盾,又沒有交代很多樓面面積的具體用途,造成西九站的體積比旺角站龐大30倍之多。為甚麽? 

19. 專家組的新方案不用回收菜園村,因興建錦上路站而受影響的零散村民少於50户,不及政府方案的三份之一,但政府卻蓄意曲解走線,聲稱要把錦田河改道,誇大影響範圍至300多户。為甚麽? 

20. 政府明知菜園村村民「不遷不拆」的訴求,和他們多年來對土地的感情,並非用金錢賠償可以簡單解決,卻拒絕考慮毋須遷拆菜園村的專家組方案。為甚麽? 

21. 政府方案須鑽隧道入市區,影響大角咀14楝舊樓,5座葵涌及葵芳屋苑,更對西九豪宅造成噪音汚染,官員卻一直淡化影響和迴避居民質詢,更根本的問題是政府拒絕考慮能夠避免所有上述影響的專家組方案。為甚麽? 

22. 政府明知工程標價趨勢正在回落(例如鋼筋價格已在過去一年內下跌四成半),工程界亦不希望政府工程過份集中,引致勞工短缺和推高標價,但政府卻以延誤開工會抬高造價和導致每天損失五百萬元為理由,以不符合經濟邏輯的空話唬嚇市民。為甚麽? 

23. 政府一方面表示了解市民憂慮,不願見到樓價過高,卻另一方面把幾百億資金硬塞在西九龍,間接推高市區樓價,讓市民百上加斤。為甚麽? 

高鐵廿三條 通通未解決

立法會三思 向市民負責